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The humanitarian response to major
disasters is often marred by duplication
and fragmentation, resulting in insufficient
resources and services reaching the victims
[1]. This is particularly critical when it
comes to surgical care in mass disasters,
both because the impact of surgical
services on mortality requires a rapid
response, and because surgical teams are
often the most difficult to recruit.
In response to the 2010 Haiti earth-
quake, Me ´decins sans Frontie `res (MSF)
deployed the largest surgical team in the
organization’s 40-year history: in 10
weeks, over 55,000 patients were treated
and over 4,000 surgical interventions
performed. The overall combined re-
sponse was perhaps one of the largest
non-conflict humanitarian surgical efforts
in human history. However, the delivery
of care was fraught with supply delays, a
lack of appropriately experienced surgeons
and anesthesiologists, and challenges in
coordinating with other agencies—govern-
mental, military, and non-governmental—
whose priorities and motives did not
always agree. We highlight some challeng-
es from this recent experience and propose
some ways forward to support an effective




Surgical care was one of the primary
health needs in the post-earthquake re-
sponse. An estimated quarter of a million
injured victims suffered internal injuries,
crushed limbs, open wounds, and fractures
[2]. The most gravely injured victims died
instantly or shortly after the quake due to
long extraction times and the severity of
their wounds. First-aid and triage stations
were essential in the first hours. Many
patients needed surgical procedures such
as wound debridement and amputations—
these operations were required within
days. In the ensuing weeks, surgical needs
increased as more patients sought medical
care, often with infected, even gangrenous
wounds. Non-trauma surgical needs such
as emergency obstetrical care escalated in
the weeks to months after the quake as the
pre-earthquake fragile health care system
completely collapsed.
Over 600 health agencies responded to
the Haiti earthquake, but few had the
relevant experience, competence, or ca-
pacity to provide the infrastructure needed
to support emergency surgical services. A
lack of coordination of services resulted in
too many agencies trying to provide the
same care in the same area while other
sections of the city had no access to
emergency care. Many military and hu-
manitarian groups left after a few weeks,
leaving thousands of post-operative pa-
tients behind. MSF’s post-operative and
rehabilitation hospitals were overwhelmed
with patients who had been left without
follow-up for their amputated limbs,
wounds, and fractures. Referral systems
were not well established. Communication
between agencies was poor and most
worked in isolation from one another.
Standard databases and common defini-
tions were not shared between agencies
and the total number of operations and
interventions performed during the
months after the earthquake is unknown.
Rumors circulated by media about inap-
propriate amputations [3] were difficult to
confirm or refute without reliable data.
Criticism of poor coordination is a
common feature of large humanitarian
disasters from the Rwandan genocide [4]
to the 2004 Asian tsunami [5], and Haiti
was no different [1,6]. The need for
improved coordination between humani-
tarian actors in emergencies is a long-
standing concern: efforts to formalize
international oversight began with propos-
als to establish a relief coordination func-
tion as part of the United Nations (UN)
system in the mid-1960s. Specifically, in
1991, the Office for the Coordination of
Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) was created
to improve inter-agency coordination [7].
In 2005, the cluster system was established
to provide information to organizations
delivering care in different sectors such as
health, water and sanitation, and food and
logistics. However, relief efforts in high-
profile emergencies generate significant
media and political attention and financial
support,leadingtoa mass influxofactors—
over 2,000 agencies responded to the Haiti
earthquake according to some estimates.
The presence of such a high volume of
actors with varying motives, competencies,
and specificities inevitably results in a
degree of competition and duplication
among actors. Many smaller non-govern-
mental organizations could not function
independently and drained UN resources
through demands for logistical assistance
[8]. Lack of coordination is only part of the
problem.
Proximity
Proximity to the disaster is paramount
to responding rapidly and reducing the
extremely high mortality that often occurs
in the immediate aftermath of a disaster.
While disasters are by definition unpre-
dictable, experienced agencies can identify
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to conflicts (e.g., central Africa) or natural
disasters such as earthquakes and cyclones
(e.g., Central America) and establish small-
scale medical projects in order to maintain
local networks and emergency supplies of
materials and medications. This presence
in Haiti prior to the earthquake allowed
MSF and other actors to respond within
hours, just as the International Committee
for the Red Cross (ICRC) was among the
first to deliver care during the 2005
earthquake in Pakistan. In contrast, few
agencies were present in China prior to
the 2008 Sichuan earthquake and the
humanitarian surgery response there was
less effective.
The ability to rapidly import essential
materials is another challenge. MSF’s
ability to respond in the immediate
aftermath of the Haiti earthquake was
assisted by pre-positioned stock held in
Panama that arrived in Haiti the day after
the earthquake. The pre-positioning of
materials at 20 major airfields across the
globe has been suggested as a way to
expedite the arrival of relief [9]. Pre-
positioning requires substantial mainte-
nance costs and a high risk of waste as
medical and food supplies expire, but the
concept has value, particularly for surgical
supplies. Several agencies could have a
pre-agreement to maintain these and
share their use if a disaster were to arise.
Some equipment, such as oxygen and
medicines (particularly opiates for pain
relief), may be subject to importation
delays; the pre-positioning of essential
supplies could be linked to international
customs pre-clearance that would allow
rapid importation.
Supply
In a mass disaster, airports become
congested and the short supply of cargo
planes often go to the highest bidder [9].
In Haiti, humanitarian cargo planes were
diverted from Port-au-Prince to Santo
Domingo, resulting in delays of essential
surgical supplies such as an inflatable tent
hospital brought in by MSF to assist with
rapid surgical care, while high-profile
media and visiting dignitaries were al-
lowed to land at the US military–con-
trolled Port-au Prince airport. Delays,
losses, or incomplete reception of critical
and sensitive surgery, anesthesia, and
laboratory equipment hampered the over-
all effectiveness of the early response.
Essential humanitarian supplies should
receive priority in any major crisis.
Surgical care requires a certain amount
of infrastructure that cannot be realistical-
ly maintained in every country such as
sterilization machines, operating room
equipment, surgical material, and instru-
ments. ‘‘Portable operating room’’ kits
that contain the most essential material
needed to begin surgery can be hand-
carried by the first wave of surgeons and
anesthesiologists.
Human Resources
Specialists such as surgeons, anesthesi-
ologists, traumatologists, and emergency
medicine doctors experienced in treating
war wounded as well as working in
resource-limited and disaster settings are
rare [10]. Lists of these qualified special-
ists should be shared among relief agen-
cies, in addition to other key staff such as
scrub technicians, peri-operative nurses,
wound nurses, physiotherapists, and psy-
chologists. The American College of
Surgeons had lists of hundreds of sur-
geons ready to be deployed to Haiti, but
humanitarian agencies were reluctant to
use them because inexperience in emer-
gency settings can be more of a liability
than a help. More recently, in the United
Kingdom a register of surgeons, anesthe-
siologists, emergency physicians and nurs-
es, and supporting staff qualified and
willing to work in disasters has been
established [11]. Training for disasters is
provided by organizations such as the
ICRC who lead 3-day war surgery
seminars (which can be applied to natural
disasters) and courses in disaster manage-
ment. These are catered for surgeons with
little to no disaster management experi-
ence, and also include lectures on hu-
manitarian law and human rights that are
beneficial to medical staff intending to
work in disasters. ICRC also maintains
several training hospitals worldwide [12].
It is imperative that surgical personnel
interested in volunteering in humanitari-
an crises are effectively prepared or have
prior field experience.
Preparing for the Next Disaster
While efforts to coordinate the multi-
tude of actors responding to the vast needs
in emergencies will remain an ongoing
concern of host governments and the UN,
one of the most important lessons to be
drawn from Haiti is that not all actors are
equal, and organizational triage is needed
to support prioritization of relief according
to the most urgent needs. Given the
particular challenges to delivering timely
surgical assistance in emergencies, we
propose the formation of the Emergency
Surgery Coalition (ESC), a group consist-
ing of organizations with extensive expe-
rience in delivering surgical care in man-
made or natural disasters, and logistical
and human resource capacity to deliver
care worldwide at immediate notice. The
ESC would facilitate coordination among
major surgical providers to maximize the
effectiveness of each actor’s ability to
deliver assistance in a given context. The
ESC would not limit the reactivity and
independence of its member organiza-
tions, and would be governed on a rotating
basis by major humanitarian surgical
providers who meet on a regular basis to
ensure updated supplies and organization-
al and educational systems. Recommen-
dations for the next disaster are summa-
rized in Box 1.
Prior to a Disaster
Prior to a disaster, the ESC could
develop and maintain emergency prep kits
worldwide. A continuous supply of medi-
cations such as analgesics, anesthetics, and
antibiotics are needed and the ESC could
work directly with the relevant government
authorities and other competent bodies to
ensure their expeditious delivery. It would
prioritize the provision of training for
surgical personnel, especially orthopedic
and plastic surgeons, to prepare them for
emergency work as an important step
towards building a larger trained work-
force. It could circulate lists of qualified
surgical personnel among its members.
The ESC could also define model
surgical strategies and triage plans for
major disasters. When thousands of victims
need surgical attention, not all can be
assisted when resources are limited. In
Haiti, most surgical agencies provided care
without a specific strategy and resources
may not have been utilized as efficiently as
possible. For example, some surgeons spent
precious hours trying to save the life of one
patient at the expense of treating several
others who were less gravely injured.
Finally, in order to improve program
monitoring and evaluation, the ESC could
encourage its members to agree upon a
standard database with standard typology,




the disaster is critical to evaluate the level of
response needed and should be conducted
by agencies already present at the time of
the disaster if possible. The ESC could
rapidly disseminate this information to
other major providers to facilitate planning.
In a disaster setting, the ESC would
improve referral and transfer systems.
While there is a need for many triage
PLoS Medicine | www.plosmedicine.org 2 April 2011 | Volume 8 | Issue 4 | e1001025and stabilization points and a critical
number of operating theatres, specialty
services such as intensive care units should
be limited in number and centralized. For
example, in Haiti, one organization pro-
vided dialysis for crush syndrome and
patients from all over the city were
transferred for this service [14]. Without
an overall coordinating body, many agen-
cies try to provide all levels of care,
resulting in duplication of some services
and a paucity of others.
Post Disaster
There is a pressing need for better
monitoring and evaluation of surgical
programs in humanitarian settings. The
establishment of an inter-agency database
would permit an analysis of trends and risk
factors related to mortality and morbidity
rates associated with surgical disease and
interventions,and allow for interventionsto
be adapted accordingly in future disasters.
Efforts must also be made to better
characterize the burden of surgical disease
in crisis settings. Reliable estimates are
lacking in general [15], and in humanitar-
ian emergencies in particular [16]. While
the nature and volume of medical need in
humanitarian emergencies is difficult to
predict, concerted efforts have led to the
establishment of reliable datasets for the
analysis of trends in mortality and mor-
bidity due to infectious diseases, malnutri-
tion, and violence [17]. Recent initiatives
to better estimate the global burden of
surgical disease could help to better
characterize the surgical burden of disease
in humanitarian crises.
Conclusions
Improved surgical delivery will require
pre-emptive planning and inter-agency
coordination. The ESC, comprising key
players from major surgical humanitarian
agencies, is a proposal to improve surgical
delivery in emergencies and could support
collaboration between surgical actors in an
effort to minimize delay and duplication in
the deployment of essential surgical ser-
vices in future disasters.
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